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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model of debt contracts in order to
analyze the conditions under which domestic residents would choose
to denominate debts in “dollars”. In the model, borrowers are pro-
ducers of non-traded goods, and subject to shocks on prices. The real
exchange rate varies in response to real shocks. There is a domes-
tic unit of account; prices in terms of that unit can be shocked by
a (presumably policy - induced) disturbance. Debt obligations can
be denominated in either traded goods (dollarized contracts) or local
currency. When real and nominal shocks are possitively correlated,
dollarized contracts tend to be preferable to (non-contingent) nomi-
nal contracts when nominal shocks are large and real shocks are small.
1 Introduction
The practices concerning the denomination of financial contracts between
residents of a given country vary widely from case to case. In some in-
stances, nominal contracting is the norm, even for assets with long matu-
rities. In other countries, agents routinely utilize indexed units in a large
set of transactions. Some economies are characterized by a large-scale use
of foreign currency denominations. Clearly, the denomination of assets may
∗This is mostly WORK - IN - PROGRESS. Please do not quote.
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have strong eﬀects on macroeconomic performance. In particular, shocks
which can lead to slight disturbances to the contractual system if liabilities
are denominated in a certain unit can induce a major breakdown with an-
other unit of denomination. “Dollarized” financial systems are vulnerable
to large movements in the real exchange rate. There is ample evidence to
this eﬀect in recent episodes. The shortcomings of liability dollarization have
been much discussed, for example, in the context of the Argentine crisis. At
the same time, dollarized contracts emerge as a “market outcome”. It seems
important to understand what leads agents to choose such arrangements.
In any case, the denomination of contracts influences the costs and bene-
fits of alternative courses of monetary policies: dollarization can create “fear
of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart (2002)). Conversely, the choice of contrac-
tual units can be expected to depend on the anticipated behavior of mone-
tary authorities. The interaction between the features of monetary policies
and the types of contracts which are prevalent in the economy is certainly
an interesting and relevant matter, but we will not deal with it here. The
analysis concentrates on the decisions of private agents, taking as given the
determination of “outside” shocks and policy surprises.
The notion of “original sin” has received much attention in the literature
(see, for example, Haussmann and Panizza (2003)). The argument refers
to the inability of many governments to borrow in international markets by
issuing debt denominated in their own currency. The phenomenon seems
naturally linked to the incentives that governments may have to reduce the
real value of their liabilities (or those of domestic residents) against non-
residents (see Chamón (2001) and Tirole (2002))1. We are concerned with a
related but diﬀerent issue, namely, the dollarization of financial transactions
due to the size and variance of nominal and real shocks. This problem may
also be applied to the domestic capital market, which is what Haussmann and
Panizza (2003) call “domestic original sin”. These authors state that a few
countries suﬀer from a pure domestic original sin, that is, only five countries
possess a high proportion of foreign - currency - denominated domestic debt.
However, if we take a broader measurement definition of domestic original sin
(including not only currency but also maturity mismatches) then the amount
of countries is much larger.
We represent in a very simple way the incentives of individuals to write
1In a diﬀerent framework, Jeanne (1999a, 1999b) also studies this problem in models
with either moral hazard or adverse selection.
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contracts of one type or other. The economy produces two goods. The output
of traded goods is determined exogenously. In the simplest version of the
economy, the future price of non tradeables is assumed to be (exogenously)
stochastic. First, these prices are scaled by a random variable that indicates
in a very elementary way the potential for “monetary shocks”. Producers of
non-traded goods must borrow resources in order to finance their production
projects from lenders who own the traded good endowments. Borrowers
consume both goods, according to Cobb-Douglas preferences. Their indirect
utilities depend linearly on the value of realized income in the future. Lenders
only consume tradeables. Default is assumed to entail social losses. There are
two states for the nominal exchange rate and two states for the real exchange
rates.
We have been able to obtain the following results. With “dollar” (T -
good) denominated debt contracts default may occur when the real exchange
rate takes a large enough value. In particular, when these are positively
correlated, default occurs when the relative price of non - tradeables (in terms
of tradeables) is low if in this scenario the real exchange rate is even larger
than the minimum value to induce default with dollar contracts. Hence, if
there is default with high real exchange rates with nominal contracts there
must also be default with dollar contracts. There may also be default with low
real exchange rates under nominal contracts if the volatility of the nominal
exchange rate is high enough.
In terms of borrower’s preferences for any of the two contract types, we
were able to arrive to the following results considering the case when the real
and the nominal exchange rate are positive correlated. If no default occurs
under each contract, the borrower prefers the nominal one. The reason is that
the nominal debt contract oﬀers some extra hedge that the dollar contract
does not generate. When the choice is restricted to the nominal contract
with no default and the dollar contract with default with high real exchange
rates, then it is possible that the borrower may still prefer the dollar contract
over the nominal one, provided that the default cost is low enough and the
borrower’s payment with the high real exchange rate is close enough to the
borrower’s output. Also, if the choice is between a nominal contract that
leads to default with low real exchange rates and a dollar contract that
implies default with high real exchange rates, then the borrower chooses the
dollar contract as long as the volatility of the real exchange rate is not too
large. This confirms the obvious statement that not only nominal volatility
but also real volatility matters for this kind of choice.
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There has been some recent literature regarding the relationship between
monetary policy and liability dollarization, in particular, Ize and Levy - Yey-
ati (2003), Ize and Parrado (2002), Jeanne (2003) and Broda and Levy-Yeyati
(2003). The two first papers obtain the theoretical result that the propor-
tion of dollar - denominated debt is increasing in the inflation volatility and
decreasing in the real exchange rate volatility. Jeanne shows that when the
probability of a future devaluation is large enough then debt in dollar is
large and default occurs as long as the devaluation is large. Our results
have some analogy to these. The Broda and Levy-Yeyati model studies the
optimal deposit denomination problem by a bank, which resembles the bor-
rower’s choice problem in our model. However, their main result is driven by
a negative externality from dollar-contract depositors against peso-contract
depositors, i.e., in equilibrium deposit dollarization is too high relative to the
eﬃcient level. Our model does not rely on externalities. On the contrary,
the equilibrium allocations obtained in this paper can also be interpreted as
the result of a social planner’s problem facing the same informational and
contractual constraints as the agents in the model.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the simplest model
on the basis of an analysis of cases of default in individual experiments.
Section 3 presents results that contemplate the preferences of borrowers.
Section 4 presents the main conclusions.
2 A simple analysis: instances of default in
an individual experiment with risk-neutral
lenders
This section discusses the conditions under which nominal and tradeable-
goods denominated debts are subject to default, taking as given the relative
price of non-tradeables and assuming that credit is supplied by agents who
have linear preferences on traded goods. Also (and this is a hypothesis that
is maintained throughout the paper), the distribution of nominal variables
(represented by the nominal exchange rate) is supposed to be exogenous
with respect to the decisions of agents regarding the standard of denomina-
tion: this ignores the potential feedbacks of the contractual pattern on the
incentives of monetary policies. The set of assumptions allows to establish
some simple and intuitive propositions on the ”vulnerability” of contracts to
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shocks.
2.1 Tradeable-goods denominated contracts
Domestic producers of non-traded goods finance projects that require k units
of tradeables to generate a (deterministic) quantity of non-tradeables Ak.
The price of non-tradeables can take on two possible values, pNL and pNH ,
and the probability of pNL is denoted by π. In case of default, the output
of the firm is appropriated by the lenders, and there is a fixed cost, of ψ
traded goods, paid up to a third party whose decisions are not modelled
in this exercise with an individual investor. The expected gross return in
terms of tradeables demanded by lenders to supply credit is normalized to
1. The mean value (in terms of traded goods) of the non-tradeable output
generated by the investment project is assumed to be larger than the required
investment. Then:
2.1.1 No default
This requires:
ApNH > ApNL > 1
Obviously, the “dollar” value of output in the “bad state” must be suﬃcient
to service the debt at the “no default” interest rate. This condition refers
to the levels of the values of output; for a given mean, it will be more easily
satisfied the smaller is the range in which the real exhange rate moves.
2.2 Default in state L
If the borrower defaults in state L, and not in H, clearly ApNL < 1, since
otherwise the parties would choose a contract with R = 1 and there will
be no default in any state. Now, the interest rate is given by the arbitrage
condition (1− π)R + π [ApNL − φ] = 1 (where φ = ψk¯ ). This gives the
following expression for the interest rate
R =
1− πApNL + πφ
1− π
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In addition, the value of output in the “good state” must allow repayment
at that interest rate:
ApNH − 1 > π [A (pNH − pNL) + φ]
That is, the value of output in state H must be higher enough than 1 to cover
the anticipated shortfall in the “bad state”, including the default cost. An-
other (simpler) way of expressing that condition is that the expected “dollar”
value of the project must exceed the cost of credit, including the expected
default costs:
πApNL + (1− π)ApNH > 1 + πφ
2.2.1 No credit
If ψ > 0, the previous condition need not be satisfied even though the ex-
pected value of non-tradeable production per unit of investment is larger
than 1. In that case, there may be no credit denominated in tradeables.
2.3 Nominal contracts with correlated nominal and
real exchange rates
The nominal exchange rate is denominated by λ, and can take two values, λL
and λH . Instead of considering the general case, we begin by assuming that
high real exchange rates coincide with a high nominal exchange rate. If qij
is the probability that λ has value λi and pN is pNj , then assume that qLL
= qHH = 0, qLH = 1− π and qHL = π. Then we may consider the following
subcases.
2.3.1 No default
In this case, the nominal interest rate RN is such that (1− π) RNλL + π
RN
λH
= 1, so that,
RN =
λLλH
πλL + (1− π)λH
Clearly, the no-default conditions are:
ApNL >
RN
λH
and ApNH >
RN
λL
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It can be seen, in particular, that those conditions imply the (natural) re-
quirement that the expected value of output in terms of traded goods exceed
1, but it is not necessary that ApNL > 1. Given that the nominal exchange
rate would be higher in the state with low real prices of non-tradeables, the
condition on pNL is weaker than in the case of “dollarized” contracts. For
similar reasons, the condition on pNH is stronger.
IfApNL < 1, implying that there is default with traded-good-denominated
contracts, the no-default conditions for nominal contracts can be written as:
1− (1− π)ApNH
πApNH
<
λL
λH
<
(1− π)ApNL
1− πApNL
These inequalities bound the ratio between the nominal exchange rates in
both states (that is, the variability of the nominal variable) as a function
of the real prices of non-tradeables. Nominal contracts can “avoid” default
when “dollar” denominated contracts are subject to default if changes in the
nominal rate counteract the eﬀects of “real” shocks on the prices of non-
tradeables and, at the same time, the variability of the nominal exchange
rate is not “too large”.
It can be seen that, provided that the values of non-tradeable output
satisfy the expected value condition, πApNL+ (1 − π)ApNH > 1, there is
no default with nominal contracts if λLpNH = λHPNL, that is, if “monetary
policy stabilizes” the nominal price of non-traded goods. That condition
reproduces the situation that would be generated with contracts with pay-
ments indexed with the prices of non-traded goods (given that there is no
uncertainty on the volume of output).
2.3.2 Default in state of high real exchange rate
In this case, there is default when pN = pNL. A condition for this to hold is
ApNL <
λL
πλL + (1− π)λH
which is a stronger requirement than that which establishes default in the
state pNL with traded-goods contracts. Now, the nominal interest rate would
be given by the condition (1− π) RNλL + π (ApNL − φ) = 1 or,
RN =
λL
1− π [1− πApNL + πφ]
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This implies that the solvency condition in state pNH has the same ex-
pression than in the case with traded-goods contracts:
ApNH − 1 > π [A (pNH − pNL) + φ]
It can be seen that, in order to have default in the state pNL with nominal
contracts, there must also be default with traded-goods denominated con-
tracts: the rise in the nominal exchange rate does not compensate for the
fall in the “dollar” value of output. In fact, here, the nominal contract is
equivalent to a “dollar” contract, since in both cases the traded-goods value
of payments in the pNH state must be equal, so that it covers the expected
value of “dollar losses” resulting from the “liquidation” of the project in the
state of high real exchange rate.
2.3.3 Default in the state with low real exchange rate
Nominal contracts may imply default in states where there would never be
default with traded-goods contracts: this would be the case when the nominal
exchange rate is “so high” in the state pNL that this drives the nominal
interest rate to a point where the nominal value of output in the state pNH is
insuﬃcient to service the debt. Thus, the condition for default in state pNH
is:
ApNH <
λH
πλL + (1− π)λH
That is, λHλL has to be high enough so as to compensate for the fact that
ApNH > 1. This corresponds to a situation with a large “nominal variability”,
which would tend to make nominal contracts less attractive.
In order for the revenue in state pNL to allow repayment of the debt, it
must be that: ApNl > 1 − (1− π) [A (pNH − pNL)− φ] or:
πApNL + (1− π)ApNH > 1 + (1− π)φ
Interestingly, this does not necessarily imply ApNL > 1, if φ is suﬃciently
small. Nominal impulses can then “inverse” the states of default, and make
the firm solvent in state pNL (which may be a state of default with T-
contracts) and subject to default in state pNH (which is the “good state” with
T-contracts). The gross interest rate must now satisfy πRNλH +(1− π) (ApNH − φ) =
1
RN =
µ
λH
π
¶
(1 + (1− π)φ− (1− π)ApNH)
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2.3.4 No credit
If the conditions for “solvency in at least one state” are not met, there will
not be nominal contracting. In this case of correlated high real exchange
rate- high nominal exchange rate, since the conditions for the firm to be
insolvent in the pNL state with nominal contracts imply those for insolvency
in that state for T-contracts, it follows that, if there is no possibility of credit
in nominal terms, “dollar” credits are also not feasible. Of course, the result
does not mean that nominal contracting will “dominate” T-contracts: such
contracts may imply less chances of default if “nominal variability” is large.
2.4 Nominal contracts with negatively correlated real
and nominal exchange rates
This case (maybe not a “realistic” one) is that in which the movements in the
nominal exchange rate amplify the price movements induced by real shocks:
the currency revalues nominally when the real exchange rate is high (and,
therefore, when the price of non-traded goods would tend to fall under a
fixed exchange rate). Here, the assumption is: qLL = π, qHH = 1− π, qLH =
qHL = 0.
2.4.1 No default
The conditions are now:
ApNL >
λH
πλH + (1− π)λL
and ApNH >
λL
πλH + (1− π)λL
The second inequality is always satisfied since, by assumption, ApNH > 1.
The first one requires ApNL > 1. In this case, there can only be no default
(in any state) under nominal contracting if there is never default with “dollar
contracts”. Also, with nominal contracts, there will never be default in state
pNH if there is no default in state pNL.
2.4.2 Default in the state with high real exchange rate
The conditions for this case to be consistent with equilibrium are:
ApNL <
λH
πλH + (1− π)λL
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and
πApNL + (1− π)ApNH > 1 + πφ
This implies that, every time that there is default in state pNH under T-
contracting, there will also be default under nominal contracting. Here, there
is no case in which nominal contracts “avoid” defaults that occur under
“dollar contracts”.
2.4.3 No credit
There can be situations where nominal credit is impossible (i.e. there would
be default in any state) while there is no default at all with T-contracts. This
would hold if
1 < ApNL <
λH
πλH + (1− π)λL
and
1 < πApNL + (1− π)ApNH < 1 + πφ
3 Ranking of contracts according to the pref-
erence of borrowers
Given the multiplicity of cases considered above, we focus only on some of
them. In particular, we will take the assumption that the real exchange
rate and the nominal exchange rate are positively correlated, that is, qLL
= qHH = 0, qLH = 1 − π and qHL = π. We think that this may be the
most relevant assumption given that usually nominal and rel devaluations
happen together. Within this case we consider three subcases. The first one
compares the nominal and T - good contract when there is no default under
each unit of account. The second subcase compares both contracts when
there is no default with the nominal one and when there is default when
pNL. The third subcase focuses on the situation with default when pNH if
using the T good contract and with default at pNL if using the nominal
contract. Given that borrowers possess Cobb-Douglas preferences, we know
that the indirect utility at a state λ, pN is given by
I(pN ,λ)
λp1−αN
Φ, where Φ ≡
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αα (1− α)1−α , I (λ, pN) is the nominal income received by the borrower in
state (λ, pN), and where α constitutes the weight of the utility function on
tradeable goods. We now consider the expected value of this indirect utility
function under each subcase.
3.1 No default under both contracts
Clearly we have here that the value of the borrower’s nominal income and
the indirect utility function in each state (λ, pN) are given by:
T−Good contract Nominal Contract
I (λ, pN) λ [ApN − 1] λApN − λLλHπλL+(1−π)λH
Indirect Utility Φ
£
ApαN − pα−1N
¤
Φ
h
ApαN − λLλHπλL+(1−π)λH
pα−1N
λ
i
Hence the expected indirect utility is in each case
Φ
£
AE [pαN ]− E
£
pα−1N
¤¤
with the T good contract
Φ
·
AE [pαN ]− π
λL
πλL + (1− π)λH
pα−1NL − (1− π)
λH
πλL + (1− π)λH
pα−1NH
¸
with nominal
Thus, the relevant comparison is:
πpα−1NL + (1− π) pα−1NH Q π
λL
πλL + (1− π)λH
pα−1NL + (1− π)
λH
πλL + (1− π)λH
pα−1NH
The next result shows the following:
Proposition 1 Under the assumption qLL = qHH = 0, qLH = 1 − π and
qHL = π, if there is no default under any contract, then the borrower prefers
(ex-ante) the nominal contract to the “dollar” contract.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that
πpα−1NL + (1− π) pα−1NH > π
λL
πλL + (1− π)λH
pα−1NL + (1− π)
λH
πλL + (1− π)λH
pα−1NH
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Now, we know that the latter is true if and only if
πpα−1NL [πλL + (1− π)λH ] + (1− π) pα−1NH [πλL + (1− π)λH ]
> λLπpα−1NL + λH (1− π) pα−1NH
which is equivalent to:
πpα−1NL [πλL + (1− π)λH − λL] > (1− π) pα−1NH [λH − [πλL + (1− π)λH ]]
⇔
πpα−1NL (1− π) [λH − λL] > (1− π) pα−1NH π [λH − λL]
and, given λH > λL, and π ∈ (0, 1) , this is equivalent to
pα−1NL > p
α−1
NH
and since pα−1NH > 0 then this last inequality is equivalent to
p1−αNH
p1−αNL
> 1
But this is true since pNH > pNL. Hence we have shown that the expected
indirect utility from the nominal contract is strictly greater than that with
T - good contract.
The intuition is the following. If both contracts are available and none of
them implies default, the nature of the correlation between the nominal and
real exchange rates (between λ and pN) gives rise to the following eﬀect. With
T good contracts, the interest rate does not allow the borrower to absorb the
shock on λ as much as with nominal shocks. Indeed, with T good contracts,
the negative term is just the expression π
p1−αNL
+ (1−π)
p1−αNH
. Instead, with nominal
contracts the negative term is π
p1−αNL
h
λL
πλL+(1−π)λH
i
+ (1−π)
p1−αNH
h
λH
πλL+(1−π)λH
i
. Thus,
in this second expression, when the denominator is a low number (p1−αNL ) the
denominator is not equal to one (as in the dolar contract) but a number less
than one. The same occurs when the denominator is a large number. In this
case the numerator is also larger than one. Hence the nominal interest rate
works as a hedge which is not the case with a dollar contract.
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3.2 No default with nominal contract, default with T
- good contracts with high real exchange rates
Given that the nominal contract is preferred with no default with either kind
of contract, it would be intuitive to think that the nominal contract will also
be preferred if there is default with dollar contracts in some state. However
there are cases (if the cost of default is very small and the payment that the
borrower has to make with the nominal contract in the high real exchange
rate state is close enough to his output) when this intuitive proposition fails
to hold.
The nominal income and indirect utility function in each state for the T
good contract is:
Value of pN pNH pNL
Nominal Income λ
£
ApNH −
¡
1−πApNL+πφ
1−π
¢¤
0
Indirect Utility Φ
£
ApαNH −
¡
1−πApNL+πφ
1−π
¢
pα−1NH
¤
0
Hence the ex-ante utility when using a T - good contract in this subcase is:
(1− π)Φ
·
ApαNH −
µ
1− πApNL + πφ
1− π
¶
pα−1NH
¸
while for the nominal contract it is the same expression as before. Hence it
is easy to show that the borrower prefers T - good contract to the nominal
contract if and only if
(1− π)
p1−αNH
·
λH
πλL + (1− π)λH
−
µ
1− πApNL + πφ
1− π
¶¸
>
π
p1−αNL
·
ApNL −
λL
πλL + (1− π)λH
¸
From here it is trivial to get the following two corollaries.
Corollary 2 If φ is close enough to ApNL then the borrower prefers the
nominal contract.
Proof. If φ=ApNL then λHπλL+(1−π)λH−
¡
1−πApNL+πφ
1−π
¢
= λHπλL+(1−π)λH−
1
1−π .
But since λH(1−π)πλL+(1−π)λH < 1 then
λH
πλL+(1−π)λH−
1
1−π is clearly negative. However
the right hand side is strictly positive, so the inequality above does not hold
when φ = ApNL. The corollary follows trivially by continuity.
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Corollary 3 If φ is small enough, and as ApNL is as close to λLπλL+(1−π)λH
as desired, then the borrower prefers the dollar contract to the nominal one.
Proof. This is not diﬃcult. The condition of ApNL > RNλH =
λL
πλL+(1−π)λH
, gives that λHπλL+(1−π)λH −
¡
1−πApNL
1−π
¢
> 0. Thus, for φ small enough then
λH
πλL+(1−π)λH−
¡
1−πApNL+πφ
1−π
¢
> 0.Also, ifApNL is suﬃciently close to λLπλL+(1−π)λH
then
h
ApNL − λLπλL+(1−π)λH
i
is as close to 0 as desired. Then the inequality
above is satisfied under these conditions.
The intuition here is simple. When ApNL is very close to λLπλL+(1−π)λH
the borrower gets very little income when pN = pNL. On the other hand,
when φ is small enough, the borrower gets a higher income under a T good
contract since, although there is default when pNL, at pNH the borrower pays
a smaller interest rate than with a nominal contract. Given that the cost of
default is small, the insurance against default given by the nominal contract
turns out to be too expensive.
3.3 Default with nominal contract when low real ex-
change rate and default with dollar contracts when
high real exchange rate.
This subcase implies the following pattern of nominal income for each diﬀer-
ent contract
(λL, pNH) (λH , pNL)
Nominal 0 λApNL −
¡
λH
π
¢
(1 + (1− π) (φ−ApNH))
T− good λ
£
ApNH −
¡
1−πApNL+πφ
1−π
¢¤
0
Therefore, the ex-ante expected utility for the borrower is respectively:
• Nominal
Φ
·
πApαNL −
(1 + (1− π) (φ−ApNH))
p1−αNL
¸
= Φ
·
πApαNL + (1− π)ApαNL
µ
pNH
pNL
¶
−
µ
1 + (1− π)φ
p1−αNL
¶¸
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• T-good
Φ
·
(1− π)ApαNH −
µ
1− πApNL + πφ
p1−αNH
¶¸
= Φ
·
(1− π)ApαNH + πApαNH
µ
pNL
pNH
¶
−
µ
1 + πφ
p1−αNH
¶¸
Recall that here we need to have the following conditions:
ApNL < 1 < 1 + πφ, πApNL + (1− π)ApNH > 1 + πφ
ApNH <
λH
πλL + (1− π)λH
πApNL + (1− π)ApNH > 1 + (1− π)φ
Hence it is clear that the T - good contract is preferred if and only if
A
·
pαNH
µ
1− π + π
µ
pNL
pNH
¶¶
− pαNL
µ
π + (1− π)
µ
pNH
pNL
¶¶¸
>
µ
1 + πφ
p1−αNH
¶
−
µ
1 + (1− π)φ
p1−αNL
¶
or
A [πpNL + (1− π) pNH ]
£
pα−1NH − pα−1NL
¤
>
µ
1 + πφ
p1−αNH
¶
−
µ
1 + (1− π)φ
p1−αNL
¶
This is impossible if π > 1
2
since then 1+πφ > 1+(1− π)φ and this implies
thatµ
1 + πφ
p1−αNH
¶
−
µ
1 + (1− π)φ
p1−αNL
¶
> (1 + πφ)
£
pα−1NH − pα−1NL
¤
> A [πpNL + (1− π) pNH ]
£
pα−1NH − pα−1NL
¤
since
£
pα−1NH − pα−1NL
¤
< 0. Therefore a necessary condition for this to hold is
π < 1
2
(although not suﬃcient). In fact it is clear that.
Proposition 4 When π < 1
2
then the T good contract is preferred if and
only if ·
pNH
pNL
¸1−α
<
A [πpNL + (1− π) pNH ]− (1 + πφ)
A [πpNL + (1− π) pNH ]− (1 + (1− π)φ)
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The proof is a trivial algebraic manipulation of the inequality above and
it is thus ommitted. This states that, for a borrower to find more profitable
to choose the dollar contract in this case (when there is default with high
real exchange rate than the nominal contract with default in the low real
exchange rate), the volatility of pN must be bounded above, provided that
the low real exchange rate scenario is more likely than the high real exchange
rate state.
3.3.1 Default with high real exchange rates with nominal con-
tracts
In this case we know that the conditions over the values of λ and pN are such
htat
ApNL <
λL
πλL + (1− π)λH
which implies that there is default with dollar contract. Note however that
the nominal interest rate in this case is equal toRN = λL1−π [1− πApNL + πφ] ,
whereas with T - good contracts it is equal to 1
1−π [1− πApNL + πφ] . There-
fore, the ex-ante utility obtained by the borrower under any contract is the
same. Thus the borrower is indiﬀerent between the nominal and the dollar
contract.
4 Indexed contracts and noisy prices in par-
tial equilibrium.
In policy as well as academic discussions regarding debt design and the orig-
inal sin problem, some researchers have suggested the need of developing
financial instruments indexed to some nominal price index,w such as the
CPI or similar. This framework can be used to analyze the desirability of
such indexed debt contracts. The main problem is that, specially in high
inflation situations, it is hard to index to the current inflation rate. That is,
at the beginning of month t, only inflation between t − 2 and t − 1 can be
known. Hence contracts may index to this inflation rate. However, it may
be the case that the inflation between t − 1 and t is very diﬀerent from the
former inflation rate. Hence indexation may lead to distorted payoﬀs, in the
sense that this type of adjustment may imply real eﬀects on debtors’s debt
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repayments. This diﬃculty (which could only be avoided with very stable in-
flation rates) may reduce the incentives to contract through indexed nominal
interest rates. We investigate this using our simple framework.
From the model above, suppose now that, when λpN is realized, borrowers
observe this realization completely accurately. The rest of the economy,
including lenders, only observe a noisy realization instead, equal to λpN +
x, where x constitutes a random variable, independent of both λ and pN . In
our simple scheme, we further assume that x can only take values in the set
{−ε, 0, ε} , with ε ≥ 0. Note that the case of ε = 0 is the case where lenders
observe exactly λpN . Assume furthermore that Pr (x = −ε) = Pr (x = ε) =
1
3
, so clearly E (x) = 0. The idea is that this noise variable does not introduce
any bias (in an expected sense).
Debt contracts now are indexed to the public variable λpN + x. This
means that the gross interest rate is proportional to λpN + x, more precisely,
equal to r∗ (λpN + x) , where r∗ is a positive scalar, endogenously determined
in our model. As long as borrowers do not defauly, they obtain a nominal
income equal to AλpN k¯ − r∗ (λpN + x) k¯ = [λpN (A− r∗)− r∗x] k¯. Clearly,
the borrower’s nominal income in default is 0. A lender obtains r∗ (λpN + x) k¯
if no default occurs, and λApN k¯ if default happens.
Hence we can write down the first order condition for the lender:
1
3
X
x



X
i,j∈∆indx
qij
·
pNj +
x
λi
¸
r∗ +
X
i,j∈Dindx
qij [ApNj − φ]


 = 1
where ∆indx is the set of indices i, j such that no default occurs at x, and D
ind
x
denotes the set where default occurs, given x. Solving for r∗ we obtain that
r∗ =
1− 1
3
P
x
P
i,j∈Dindx qij [ApNj − φ]
1
3
P
x
P
i,j∈∆indx qij
h
pNj +
x
λi
i = 3−PxPi,j∈Dindx qij [ApNj − φ]P
x
P
i,j∈∆indx qij
h
pNj +
x
λi
i
As before, clearly
∆indx = {i, j : λipNj (A− r∗) ≥ r∗x}
Dindx = {i, j : λipNj (A− r∗) < r∗x}
We now pursue our analysis taking the special cases considered above.
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4.1 Direct correlation between nominal and real ex-
change rates.
This is the case of qHH = qLL = 0, and qHL = π, qLH = 1− π. We consider
two cases: no default and default when x = ε only (for any λpN). This
last situation would emerge when the contract is indexed to a past inflation
rate which is suﬃciently higher than the current inflation rate faced by the
borrower, inducing a default.
4.1.1 No default
This happens when ε is small enough so that for all realizations λpN clearly
Dindε . If this condition holds, clearly there will be no default if x is either 0
or −ε. Therefore we need
ε ≤ λHpNL
·
A
r∗
− 1
¸
; ε ≤ λLpNH
·
A
r∗
− 1
¸
or
ε ≤ min {λHpNL;λLpNH}
·
A
r∗
− 1
¸
If this is true then
r∗nodef =
1
π
3
h
3pNL +
P
x
³
x
λH
´i
+ 1−π
3
h
3pNH +
P
x
³
x
λL
´i
=
1
πpNL + (1− π) pNH
Therefore the condition over ε can be written as
ε ≤ min {λHpNL;λLpNH} [A [πpNL + (1− π) pNH ]− 1]
The borrower’s expected utility can be also obtained:
V b,indnodef = Λ [πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH ] [A− r∗] = Λ [πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH ]
·
A− 1
πpNL + (1− π) pNH
¸
where Λ ≡ αα (1− α)1−α
The next question is the following. Suppose that borrowers can actually
choose between an indexed contract and a T-good denominated contract.
Hence we can show that:
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Proposition 5 If no default occurs under both nominal indexed and dollar
denominated contracts then borrowers choose the nominal indexed contract.
The proof is in the appendix. This result is not surprising. Given that no
default occurs under both contracts, the indexed debt possesses better risk
sharing properties than the dollar contract. The next case assumes a value
of ε so that default occurs for any λpN .
4.1.2 Default when ε is large
Suppose now that as long as x is not ε no default occurs, but when x = ε
borrowers always default. Hence this implies
ε > λHpNL
·
A
r∗
− 1
¸
; ε > λLpNH
·
A
r∗
− 1
¸
so
ε > max {λHpNL;λLpNH}
·
A
r∗
− 1
¸
Given that default occurs for x = ε, for any λpN , then r∗ must satisfy:
r∗ =
1 + 1
3
[φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)]
1
3
h
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´i
=
3 + [φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)]
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´
Therefore the condition on ε can be written as
ε > max {λHpNL;λLpNH}


A
h
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´i
3 + [φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)]
− 1


Note that the left hand side is zero at ε∗ that satisfies
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε∗
µ
π
λHp1−αNL
+
1− π
λLp1−αNH
¶
=
3 + [φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)]
A
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ε∗ =
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)−
³
3+φ−A(πpNL+(1−π)pNH)
A
´
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´
Given that the right hand side is decreasing in ε, then the condition above
holds at least for all ε > ε∗ (as well as for ε < ε∗ but suﬃciently close to ε∗).
Now, we also want that the parameters are such that the indexed contract
leading to no default is not available. Hence
ε > λHpNL [A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− 1] ; ε > λLpNH [A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− 1]
so
ε > max {λHpNL;λLpNH} [A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− 1]
Therefore
ε > max {λHpNL;λLpNH}max





A
h
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´i
3 + [φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)]
− 1


[A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− 1]}
Suppose that this holds. Then the utility for the borrower is
V b,inddef,ε =
Λ
3
2 [πpαNL + (1− π)
α pNH ]

A−

 3 + φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´




+
Λ
3
ε
·
π
λHp1−αNL
+
1− π
λLp1−αNH
¸
 3 + φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´


Comparison with a T -good contract without default. The next ques-
tion is whether a borrower finds more profitable to use an indexed contract
that induces default at ε or a T-good contract that induces no default. For
this, the utility for the borrower of this last type of debt contract is
V b,Tnodef = Λ
£
A [πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH ]−
£
πpα−1NL + (1− π) pα−1NH
¤¤
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Hence the T-good contract is preferrable if and only if
A [πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH ]−
£
πpα−1NL + (1− π) pα−1NH
¤
≥ 2
3
[πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH ]

A−

 3 + φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´




ε
3
·
π
λHp1−αNL
+
1− π
λLp1−αNH
¸
 3 + φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´


Rearranging:
A
3
≥
πpα−1NL + (1− π) pα−1NH + 13


(3+φ)
·
ε
µ
π
λHp
1−α
NL
+ 1−π
λLp
1−α
NH
¶
−2[πpαNL+(1−π)pαNH]
¸
2(πpNL+(1−π)pNH)−ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−π
λL
´


πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH +


(πpNL+(1−π)pNH)
·
ε
µ
π
λHp
1−α
NL
+ 1−π
λLp
1−α
NH
¶
−2[πpαNL+(1−π)pαNH]
¸
2(πpNL+(1−π)pNH)−ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−π
λL
´


This is true in particular for A large enough. On the other hand, we had
that
ε > max {λHpNL;λLpNH}max





A
h
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´i
3 + [φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)]
− 1


[A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− 1]}
All these three inequalities involving A, φ and ε imply that the borrower
prefers the T− good contract (with no default).
Note in particular that, for φ is large enough, it is not necessarily true
that the borrower prefers the T−good contract. The reason is that even
though the indexed interest rate is an increasing function of φ, the ex-ante
utility for the borrower of this contract is not necessarily decreasing in the
interest rate. This is because there exists a state of nature in which x = −ε,
and so the borrower pays less than the true value of ApN . This cost-savings
are larger the larger is the interest rate. Hence, only when
ε
µ
π
λHp1−αNL
+
1− π
λLp1−αNH
¶
− 2 [πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH ] < 0
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or
ε <
2 [πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH ]³
π
λHp
1−α
NL
+ 1−π
λLp
1−α
NH
´
it is true that for φ large enough (and A fixed) the borrower prefers the T -
good contract wityh no default to the indexed contract with default at x =
ε.
Case of default with T -good contracts Suppose now that the compar-
ison is between an indexed contract with default at x = ε and a T -good
contract that induces default at λHpNL. In such a case the indirect utility of
this T -good contract is
V BT−def = Λp
α
NH
·
(1− π)A− (1− πApNL + πφ)
pNH
¸
Hence this T -good contract is preferred to the indexed contract if and only
if
pαNH
·
(1− π)A− (1− πApNL + πφ)
pNH
¸
≥ 2
3
[πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH ]

A−

 3 + φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´




+
ε
3
·
π
λHp1−αNL
+
1− π
λLp1−αNH
¸
 3 + φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´


and again:
ε > max {λHpNL;λLpNH}max





A
h
2 (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− ε
³
π
λH
+ 1−πλL
´i
3 + [φ−A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)]
− 1


[A (πpNL + (1− π) pNH)− 1]}
Again, both inequalities imply restrictions on the parameters. SEE IF I CAN
CHARACTERIZE THIS MORE SHARPLY.
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5 Generalization to the case of endogenous
relative prices.
Consider again an economy that lasts for two periods, t = 0, 1, and with
two types of consumers, lenders and borrowers. Unlike the model presented
above, both types of agents consume two commodities, a tradeable (denoted
by T ) good and a non - tradeable (N) good. Lenders receive a sure endow-
ment of T goods equal to k¯ > 0 at date 0 and a random date - 1 endowment
of T goods equal to ey1T . Entrepreneurs have no endowment but own a tech-
nology that produces N goods in period 1 out of T goods invested in period
0. Assume that the scale of the investment is fixed. Borrowers may invest 0
tradeable goods in period 0 (and get 0 non tradeable goods in period 1) or
either they invest a fixed amount k¯ > 0 of T goods at date 0 and receive Ak¯
units of N goods in period 1, where A > 1. In order to invest entrepreneurs
borrow k¯ units of T goods from lenders at date 0. For this to happen the en-
trepreneur and the lender sign a debt contract promising a gross interest rate
equal to R. In period 1 entrepreneurs sell part of the non tradeable goods
produced in that same period to honor the debt. However the enforcement
of this repayment is partial. It is assumed that the entrepreneur may default
on its debt contract. However, there exists a third party with the power of
(potentially) punishing the borrower if this defaults. The paper will assume
two alternative scenarios about the punishment technology. We also assume
for simplicity that ey1T can be expressed as ezk¯.
Lenders are assumed to have the following preferences:
UL = k¯ − k +EL0
£
u
¡
cLT , c
L
N
¢¤
where k ∈
£
0, k¯
¤
is the amount of T goods lent to entrepreneurs, cLj the
amount of j goods (j = T ,N) consumed by lenders at date 1 and EL0 is the
expectation operator according to the lender’s date 0 beliefs. Entrepreneurs
are assumed to have preferences represented by an ex-ante expected utility
function
EB0
£
u
¡
cBT , c
B
N
¢¤
where cBj is the amount of j goods (j = T ,N) consumed by borrowers at date
1 and EB0 is the expectation operator according to the entrepreneur’s date 0
beliefs. The function u is assumed to be identical across agents and to have
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a Cobb-Douglas form:
u
¡
chT , c
h
N
¢
=
¡
chT
¢α ¡
chN
¢1−α
with 0 < α < 1 and h = L,B.
As before, the absolute date 1 price of T goods is assumed to be equal
to eλ, while the date 1 absolute price of N goods is equal to eλpN , where pN
denotes again the relative price of non tradeables in terms of tradeables andeλ being the nominal shock in period 1. We assume that
Assumption λ is a strictly positive random variable with support in the set
Λ = {λL,λH} , where 0 < λL < λH . The random variable z has support
in the set Z = {zL, zH} with 0 < zL < zH . The joint distribution is
given by q (z,λ) , where 0 5 q (z,λ) 5 1 and
P
z,λ q (z,λ) = 1. Let S ≡
Λ× Z.
6 The general model under symmetric infor-
mation.
After getting the equilibrium price, we turn to the analysis of the equilibrium
contracts. The first subsection assumes that the transfers that borrowers
must repay ex - post are denominated in non tradeables. Throughout this
section the state of nature (λ, z) is common knowledge. Lenders also know
that, in case of a default by the borrowers, the third party will the total
amount of output obtained by the entrepreneurs and give this to the lenders,
where l = T,N, depending upon the denomination of the debt contract.
Hence, the default decision depends on the values of z and λ.
We assume again the existence of a fixed social cost ψ > 0 of default.
Recall that ψ represents the amount of tradeables that lenders loose when
borrowers decide not to repay their debt according to the contract. This
represents all kinds of ineﬃciencies such as litigation costs. This cost rep-
resents the income of the third party in charge of enforcing this law, called
the judge. For the sake of simplicity assume a continuum of these judges,
so that the Lebesgue measure of judges is equal to the Lebesgue measure of
lenders and that of borrowers. The judge also has the same Cobb - Douglas
utility function as lenders and borrowers. This assumption will ensure that
the aggregate demand will not depend on the parameter ψ.
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6.1 The equilibrium relative price of non-tradeables.
Before entering in the discussion about the debt contract that arises in equi-
librium, it is easy to show that the equilibrium price p∗N does not depend
on the particular contract that lenders and borrowers sign ex - ante. Let
τ (λ, z, pN) be the transfer of resources (denominates in tradeables) from
borrowers to lenders given τ , z and pN . Clearly the Cobb-Douglas assump-
tion about preferences for L, B and J imply that the aggregate demand for
tradeables in period 1 is equal to
cBT (pN ,λ) + c
L
T (pN ,λ) + c
J
T (pN ,λ) =
αIB1 (λ, pN , z)
2λ
+
αIL1 (λ, pN , z)
2λ
+
αIJ1 (λ, pN , z)
2λ
=
³ α
2λ
´ ¡
IB1 (λ, pN , z) + I
L
1 (λ, pN , z) + I
J
1 (λ, pN , z)
¢
where Ih1 (λ, pN , z) is the period 1 ex-post income of h = L,B, J.We have in
general that
IB1 (λ, pN , z, k) =
½
AλpN k¯ − τ (λ, pN , z) if no default
AλpN k¯ − τ (λ, pN , z)− λ (1− χ)ψ if default
IL1 (λ, pN , z) =
½
λzk¯ + τ (λ, pN , z) if no default
λzk¯ + τ (λ, pN , z)− λχψ if default
IJ1 (λ, pN , z) =
½
0 if no default
ψ if default
This is because whatever is paid by debtors needs to go to lenders. Therefore
IB1 (λ, pN , z) + I
L
1 (λ, pN , z) + I
J
1 (λ, pN , z) = AλpN k¯ + λzk¯ where 1{D} is an
indicator function that takes the value 1 if (z,λ) are such that there is default
and 0 otherwise. Therefore in equilibrium we must have
¡
α
λ
¢ ¡
AλpN k¯ + λz
¢
= zk¯, since z
2
is the aggregate per capita supply of tradeables in period 1.
From here it is clear that the value of pN that satisfies this is
p∗N (z) =
³ z
A
´µ1− α
α
¶
Hence we have proved the following
Proposition 6 In any equilibrium the value of pN is equal to
¡
z
A
¢ ¡
1−α
α
¢
.
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6.2 Tradeable - denominated debt contracts.
Assume now that contracts are denominated in tradeables. Suppose then
that the contract specifies that for every unit of T good borrowed by the
entrepreneur in period 0 she must return RT units of T goods (if debt is
honored) in period 1. Then the borrower may choose to default on the
remaining debt contract. If default takes place, the third party (the judge)
seizes a proportion θ of the non-tradeable good produced by the entrepreneur
at date 1 and transfers it to the lender. The social cost of default is still equal
to ψ units of T goods and split in a fraction χ for lenders and (1− χ) for
borrowers. Default does not occur if RT k¯ 5 θ pN (z) A k¯ + (1− χ) ψ.
Otherwise there is default.
We introduce the following notation.b∆ ≡ ©(λ, z) : RT k¯ 5 pN (z)Ak¯ª ; bD ≡ S\b∆
As before, we will assume that these sets are well - defined, that is, we
will assume that an equilibrium exists. With this notation at hand, we can
characterize the ex-post income of borrowers and lenders:
IB (λ, z) =
(
[pN (z)A−RT ]λk¯ ∀ (λ, z) ∈ b∆
0 ∀ (λ, z) ∈ bD
IL (λ, z, k) =
(
λzk¯ + λRTk ∀ (λ, z) ∈ b∆
λzk¯ + λpN (z)Ak − λψ ∀ (λ, z) ∈ bD
Given the Cobb - Douglas utility function for both lenders and borrowers the
first order condition for the lender can be shown to be:
1 +
X
(λ,z)∈ bD
q (z,λ)
ψαα (1− α)1−α
(pN (z))
1−α k¯
=
X
(λ,z)∈b∆
q (λ, z)RT
Ã
αα (1− α)1−α
pN (z)
1−α
!
+
X
(λ,z)∈ bD
q (λ, z) pN (z)
αA
¡
αα (1− α)1−α
¢
On the other hand, the ex-ante indirect utility function of the borrower is
UBT , equal to:¡
αα (1− α)1−α
¢
Ak¯
X
(λ,z)∈b∆
q (λ, z) pN (z)
α − k¯
X
(λ,z)∈b∆
q (λ, z)RT (λ, z)
Ã
αα (1− α)1−α
pN (z)
1−α
!
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Now, from the FOC of the lender we get
−k¯
X
(λ,z)∈b∆
q (λ, z)RT (λ, z)
Ã
αα (1− α)1−α
pN (z)
1−α
!
= k¯
X
(λ,z)∈ bD
q (λ, z) pN (z)
αA
¡
αα (1− α)1−α
¢
− k¯ −
X
(λ,z)∈ bD
q (z,λ)
ψαα (1− α)1−α
(pN (z))
1−α
Therefore replacing this in UBT we obtain:
UBT =
¡
αα (1− α)1−α
¢
Ak¯
X
(λ,z)
q (λ, z) pN (z)
α − k¯
=
¡
αα (1− α)1−α
¢
Ak¯
X
(λ,z)
q (λ, z)
·µ
z
A
1− α
α
¶¸α
− k¯ −
X
(λ,z)∈ bD
q (z,λ)
ψαα (1− α)1−α
(pN (z))
1−α
= (1− α)A1−αk¯
X
(λ,z)
q (λ, z) zα − k¯ − ψ (1− α)A1−αk¯
X
(λ,z)∈ bD
q (z,λ) zα
For the lender it is obvious that:
ULT = k¯ + α
α (1− α)1−α k¯
X
(z,λ)
q (λ, z)
µ
z
(pN (z))
1−α
¶
We further characterize the two cases to consider here:
• Case T1: b∆ = {zH , zL}
This implies that there is never default under a non - contingent, T good
denominated contract. This is the same as stating that λRT 5 λ
¡¡
1−α
α
¢
zL + (1− χ)
¡ψ
k¯
¢¢
,
and that bD = ∅. Let π ≡ qLL + qHL, so 1− π = qLH + qHH . Hence the equi-
librium interest rate must be equal to:
RT =
1
A1−αα
³
π
z1−αL
+ 1−π
z1−αH
´
So for this to be an equilibrium it must be the case that
1
A1−αα
³
π
z1−αL
+ 1−π
z1−αH
´ 5 µ1− α
α
¶
zL
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Proposition 7 For a suﬃciently large zL such that πA1−αzαL > 1, then b∆
= {zH , zL} is consistent with equilibrium.
The proof is in the appendix. This is a generalization of our simpler case
in section 2. Note that the presence of Cobb-Douglas preferences implies the
exponents of A and zL.
• Case T2: b∆ = {zH}
Therefore bD = {zL} . For this to be true we need of course that RT be
less than or equal to zH
¡
1−α
α
¢
k¯ and strictly greater than zL
¡
1−α
α
¢
k¯ . From
the first order conditions it can be shown that RT is equal to:
RT =


1
A1−α +
αψ
k¯
π
z1−αL
− (1− α)πzαL
α (1− π)

 z1−αH
Proposition 8 There exists a suﬃciently large value of zH and a small zL
(that makes the denominator of RT is strictly positive) such that this case is
consistent with an equilibrium. The inequalities are:


1
A1−α +
αψ
k¯
π
z1−αL
− (1− α)πzαL
(1− α) (1− π)

 ≤ zαH
1
A1−α (1− α)
³
π
z1−αL
+ 1−π
z1−αH
´ > zL
This result generalizes what was obtained in the exogenous pNj model.
Note that the first inequality implies
(1− α) [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ] ≥
1
A1−α
+
αψ
k¯
π
z1−αL
which is the modified version of the condition obtained in the simpler model.
Note that the weight α as well as the term A1−α now both appear as a
consequence of the assumption of symmetric (Cobb-Douglas) preferences.
The interpretation, however, does not change: the expected (weighted) T-
good value of the project exceeds the cost of credit, including the expected
default costs.
28
6.3 Characterization with nominal, non - contingent,
debt contracts
Assume that the borrower signs a contract with a lender specifying that,
for every unit of T good received at date 0, the borrower pays R (λ, z) of
nominal units in period 1. If the borrower does not honor her debt, the third
party forces the borrower to transfer a fraction θ of the non tradeables to
the lenders. Then, the borrowers’s date 1 (ex-post) income (measured in
tradeables) is equal to
λpN (z)Ak¯ −min
©
R (λ, z) k¯, AλpN k¯
ª
Therefore perfect repayment is observed if and only ifR (λ, z) k¯ 5 AλpN (z) k¯.
We can actually write down the entrepreneur’s ex-post income at date 1:
IB1 (λ, z) =
½
k [AλpN (z)−R (λ, z)] , if R (λ, z) k¯ 5 AλpNAk¯
0, otherwise
Given the Cobb-Douglas type of utility function the (ex-post) indirect utility
function is equal to
IB1 (λ, z)
λ
£
αα (1− α)1−α
¤
pN (z)
1−α
For lenders, the analysis is similar. Assume that these consumers can lend
any amount k to the borrowers. Therefore we can write down the lender’s
ex-post income in period 1:
IL1 (λ, z, k) =
½
λzk¯ +R (λ, z) k, if R (λ, z) 5 AλpN (z)
λzk¯ + λpN (z)Ak − λψ, otherwise
Given the Cobb-Douglas form the ex-post indirect utility function for lenders
is just
IL1 (λ, z, k)
λ
£
αα (1− α)1−α
¤
pN (z)
1−α
The lender will choose k ≥ 0 so as to maximize over k in
£
0, k¯
¤
k¯ − k +E0
(
IL1 (λ, z, k)
λ
£
αα (1− α)1−α
¤
pN (z)
1−α
)
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subject to
k¯ − k +E0
(
IL1 (λ, z, k)
λ
£
αα (1− α)1−α
¤
pN (z)
1−α
)
≥ k¯ +E0
(
zk¯
£
αα (1− α)1−α
¤
pN (z)
1−α
)
and note that IL1 (λ, pN , k) is always an aﬃne function of k. Hence, the level of
k is undetermined from the lender’s side, which instead gives the interest rate
which is consistent with equilibrium. Thus, we will consider any equilibrium
with k = k¯. The lender also considers pN (z) as exogenous, so the individual
k does not aﬀect pN for the individual lender.
Let us introduce some further notation. We first assume that in equi-
librium, pN is a function of (λ, z) , which will be true as shown below. Let
∆ be the set of (λ, z) such that R (λ, z) k¯ 5 θAλpNAk¯ + λ (1− χ)ψ (that
is, entrepreneurs do not default on debt). Let D be the set complement of
∆, that is, D is the set of pairs (z,λ) such that borrowers default. With
this notation at hand, the solution to the lender’s problem (in an interior
solution) implies
αα (1− α)1−α
X
(λ,z)∈∆
q (z,λ)
µ
R (λ, z)
λ (pN (z))
1−α
¶
+αα (1− α)1−α
X
(λ,z)∈D
q (z,λ) pN (z)
αA = 1 +
X
(λ,z)∈D
q (z,λ)
ψαα (1− α)1−α
(pN (z))
1−α k¯
This is because the objective function is linear in k. It s easy to show that
any interior k as a solution implies a value of R which violates the constraint.
If R satisfies this equality then the constraint also holds with equality, and
so k must be equal to k¯. For now assume the existence of ∆, D so that we
can compute the ex-ante utility levels for lenders and borrowers. For lenders
it is trivial. Given the last first order condition it is clear that UL is always
equal to
ULnom = k¯ + α
α (1− α)1−α k¯
X
(λ,z)
q (λ, z)
µ
z
(pN (z))
1−α
¶
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For borrowers the ex-ante expected utility is:
UBnom = α
α (1− α)1−α k¯A



X
(λ,z)∈∆
q (λ, z) pN (z)
α + (1− θ)
X
(λ,z)∈D
q (λ, z) pN (z)
α



−αα (1− α)1−α k¯
X
(λ,z)∈∆
q (λ, z)
R (λ, z)
λ
pN (z)
α−1
But from the first order condition of the lender we know that
αα (1− α)1−α
X
(λ,z)∈∆
q (z,λ)
R (λ, z)
λpN (z)
1−α
= 1 +
X
(λ,z)∈D
q (z,λ)
ψαα (1− α)1−α
(pN (z))
1−α k¯
− αα (1− α)1−αA
X
(λ,z)∈D
q (z,λ) pN (z)
α
Therefore we replace this in UB to get:
UBnom
= αα (1− α)1−α k¯A
X
(λ,z)∈∆
q (λ, z) pN (z)
α + αα (1− α)1−α k¯A
X
(λ,z)∈D
q (λ, z) pN (z)
α
−k¯ − αα (1− α)1−α ψ
X
(λ,z)∈D
q (λ, z)
(pN (z))
1−α
= αα (1− α)1−α k¯A
X
(λ,z)
q (λ, z) pN (z)
α − k¯ − αα (1− α)1−α ψ
X
(λ,z)∈D
q (λ, z)
(pN (z))
1−α
= (1− α)A1−αk¯
X
(λ,z)
q (λ, z) zα − k¯ − (1− α)A1−αk¯ψ
X
(λ,z)∈D
q (λ, z)
z1−α
Therefore, under non - tradeable denominated debt contracts the level of the
equilibrium indirect utility for entrepreneurs depends on which states the
entrepreneur finds optimal to default on her debt.
6.3.1 The case of positive correlation between real exchange rates
and nominal exchange rates.
As in the simple model of the first part, we assume that qLL = qHH = 0, and
qHL = π, qLH = 1 − π, with π ∈ (0, 1) . We assume as usual that both λH
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and zH are always high enough so that (λH , zH) is always in ∆. Consider the
following cases.
• Case N1: D = ∅.
This implies:
Rnom =
1
A1−αα
³
1−π
λLz
1−α
H
+ π
λHz
1−α
L
´ = λHλL
A1−αα
³
π
z1−αL
λL + 1−πz1−αH
λH
´
For this to be an equilibrium we need that zL
¡
1−α
α
¢
≥ RnomλH and zH
¡
1−α
α
¢
≥
Rnom
λL
. The first inequality is equivalent to:
zL ≥
λL
A1−αα
³
π
z1−αL
λL + 1−πz1−αH
λH
´ = 1
A1−αα
³
π
z1−αL
+ 1−π
z1−αH
λH
λL
´
while the second inequality is the same as:
zH ≥
λH
A1−αα
³
π
z1−αL
λL + 1−πz1−αH
λH
´ = 1
A1−αα
³
π
z1−αL
λL
λH
+ 1−π
z1−αH
´
Proposition 9 This case is consistent with equilibrium zL is high enough.
Given these constraints, any value of λj’s (satisfying λH > λL) and zH > zL
are consistent with equilibrium.
This case states that suﬃcient conditions to never observe default is that
the value of zL be high enough. It is not diﬃcult to show that the condition
on zL is weaker in the case of nominal contracts than that of “dollarized” con-
tracts. Again, similar arguments imply that the condition on zH is stronger
in the case of nominal contracts relative to that of “dollarized” ones2. This is
just a generalization of the results obtained in the partial equilibrium model.
These are somehow too strong conditions. As in the partial equilibrium
model, we do not need to have zL large enough so that there is no default un-
der the dollar contract and the nominal contract. The following proposition
shows this.
2The proof of these claims are available upon request.
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Proposition 10 If zL is not large enough so that bD = ∅, then it is still true
that D = ∅ if the following holds.µ
z1−αH
1− π
¶µ
1
(1− α)A1−α − πz
α
L
¶
≤ zL
zH
λH
λL
≤
³
π
z1−αL
´
1
(1−α)A1−α − (1− π) zαH
Again, this generalizes a similar condition obtained when pN was assumed
to be exogenous. The main diﬀerence is the presence of zL
zH
in the inequality
as well as λHλL .
• Case N2: ∆ = {(λL, zH)}
Here D = {(λH , zL)} . If this were the case then
R(λL,zH)nom =


1
A1−α +
αψ
k¯
π
z1−αL
− (1− α)πzαL
α


µ
z1−αH
1− π
¶
λL
For this to be consistent with an equilibrium we need to get
zL
µ
1− α
α
¶
λH < Rnom
R(λL,zH)nom 5 λLzH
µ
1− α
α
¶
The first inequality states that the value of the output obtained by the bor-
rower is not enough to repay his debt, inducing default at state (λH , zL) . The
second inequality means that, given this fact, the borrower does not default
on the other state. These two inequalities yield the following result.
Proposition 11 For this case to be consistent with an equilibrium it is suf-
ficient to have a value of zH and of λL high enough and zL low enough so
that
zL <
λL
A1−α (1− α)
h
π
z1−αL
λL + 1−πz1−αH
λH
i
zαH ≥
1
(1− π) (1− α)
·
1
A1−α
+ πzαL
µ
αφ
zL
− (1− α)
¶¸
where φ ≡ ψ
k¯
.
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This result is also a generalization of the results obtained in section 2.3.2.
Note again that the second inequality is also present in the case of tradeable
good contracts with default in zL.The first inequality is stronger than the first
inequality under which there is default with dollar contracts in zL. Hence,
we have again that if there is default with nominal contracts in the state
(λH , zL) then there must be default in the same state with T-good contracts.
• Case N3: ∆ = {(λH , zL)}
Here D = {(λL, zH)} . This case states that the default decision occurs
when the real exchange rate is low. If this were true then
R(λH ,zL)nom =


1
A1−α +
αψ
k¯
³
1−π
z1−αH
´
− (1− α) (1− π) zαH
απ

λHz1−αL
If this were an equilibrium we need that R(λH ,zL)nom 5 λHzL
¡
1−α
α
¢
and Rnom >
λL zH
¡
1−α
α
¢
.
Proposition 12 Suppose that zH is small enough so that zH < 1
A
1−α
α [(1−α)(1−π)]
1
α
.
Then there is default with nominal contracts in the state (λL, zH)if
³
λH
λL
´
is
large enough and if
zαL (1− α)π ≥
·
1
A1−α
+
αψ (1− π)
k¯z1−αH
− (1− α) (1− π) zαH
¸
(given that the right hand side is non-negative).
Hence this case implies a nominal shock very volatile and again that the
expected value in tradeables of the output is large enough to compensate the
cost of credit including the default cost, although wih the extra caveat that
zH cannot be too large. This generalizes again the similar case studied in
the simpler model. Note that the second inequality again implies that the
expected value of zα (multiplied by the constant 1−α) must be bounded be-
low. As the reader can see, this case is somehow special, since the conditions
on zL and zH are also rather special.
34
6.4 Dominance of T-good-denominated or nominal non-
contingent debt contracts
We can now compute the diﬀerence between the indirect utilities with nom-
inal contracts and with contracts denominated in T goods for the borrowers
(for lenders the diﬀerence is always 0).
UB − UBT = −ψαα (1− α)
1−α

 X
(λ,z)∈D
q (λ, z)
(pN (z))
1−α −
X
z∈ bD
q (λ, z)
(pN (z))
1−α


It is clearly the case that sgn
¡
UB − UBT
¢
must have the opposite sign ofP
(λ,z)∈D
q(λ,z)
(pN (z))
1−α −
P
(λ,z)∈ bD q(λ,z)(pN (z))1−α . Given that the functional form pN
is the same in D and bD, and given that q (λ, z) ∈ (0, 1) and pN > 0 in
equilibrium then the sign of this last term is determined by whether #D is
strictly greater or strictly less than # bD. This is an important diﬀerence with
respect to the first model. The symmetry of preferences allows to characterize
the dominance much more easily, by just looking at the states in which default
occurs and computing that diﬀerence.
We study this dominance case by case. Suppose first that there is no
default under both contracts. Hence the diﬀerence is automatizally 0. This
is completely diﬀerent from the same case in the first model. The reason of
this is again symmetry of preferences. This basically vanished the hedging
eﬀect present in the simpler model. This is because the lender now also cares
about non-tradeables, that is, the price λz. This is reflected in the interest
rate, which was absent in the first model.
Clearly, if there is no default with the T-good contract and default with
the nominal one (in the cases consistent with equilibrium) clearly the bor-
rower chooses the T-good contract. Henceforth, the rest of this subsection
will assume that the T -good contract induces default in (λH , zL). (The case of
no default implies that bD so the nominal contract is always (at least weakly)
dominated.
• Case N1.
We already stated that there exists a set of values of the exogenous vari-
ables where this is consistent with equilibrium. Since there is no default with
the nominal contract, clearlyUB−UBT = −ψαα (1− α)
1−α
h
π
(pN (zL))
1−α − 0
i
=
35
−A1−απα
(zL)
1−α < 0. Therefore here the nominal contract dominates the T − good
contract.
• Case N2
Here we have that there is default with the nominal contract in the state
(λH , zL) . Hence UB−UBT = 0, so the borrower is indiﬀerent between the two
cases.
• Case N3
Here there is default under nominal contracts in the state (λL, zH) , while
default occurs with T golod contracts in the state (λH , zL) .We first need to
show that no mutually contradictory inequalities arise here. This situation
is characterized by the following set of inequalities:


1
A1−α +
αψ
k¯
π
z1−αL
− (1− α)πzαL
(1− α) (1− π)

 ≤ zαH ;
1
A1−α (1− α)
³
π
z1−αL
+ 1−π
z1−αH
´ > zL
zαL (1− α)π ≥
·
1
A1−α
+
αψ (1− π)
k¯z1−αH
− (1− α) (1− π) zαH
¸
; zαH <
1
A1−α [(1− α) (1− π)]
plus the fact that
³
λH
λL
´
must be large enough. These four inequalities can
be reduced to:


1
A1−α +
αψ
k¯
π
z1−αL
− (1− α)πzαL
(1− α) (1− π)

 ≤ zαH <
1
A1−α [(1− α) (1− π)]h
1
A1−α +
αψ(1−π)
k¯z1−αH
− (1− α) (1− π) zαH
i 1
α
[(1− α)π]
1
α
≤ zL <
1
A1−α (1− α)
³
π
z1−αL
+ 1−π
z1−αH
´
The values of (zL, zH) consistent with these inequalities (and zL < zH) are
rather special, and not always exist. However, when ψ is suﬃciently small
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then it is possible to find values of zL and zH satisfying all relevant inequal-
ities. If these conditions are met, then the diﬀerence UB − UBT is equal to:
−ψαA1−α
·
1− π
z1−αH
− π
z1−αL
¸
This is strictly negative if and only if
zH
zL
>
µ
1− π
π
¶ 1
1−α
so in this case (under the conditions of case 2) the T - good contract dom-
inates the nominal contract. Note that since zH
zL
> 1 this implies that π <
1
2
.3
6.5 The case of non-tradeable (nominal indexed) de-
nominated contracts
Suppose now a contract that specifies an interest rate (contigent on z) ex-
pressed in units of N goods. This is equivalent to have a nominal contract
whose payments are contingent to the value of λpN (z). The contract specifies
that, if no default occurs, the value of pesos to be paid is equal to λpN (z) r,
where r must be specified. Note that r must be less than A for at least one
value of z, otherwise the entrepreneur prefers not to borrow any amount of
T good in period 0. Hence the following assumption is made to guarantee
this:
Assumption The values of (zL, zH) satisfies
πzαL + (1− π) zαH ≥
1
A1−α (1− α)
In this case the following proposition can be shown.
Proposition 13 The assumption above is suﬃcient to obtain an r such that
the contract specified above implies D being empty. The value of r is given
by
r =
Aα
(1− α) [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]
3The reader can check that the following parameter values are consistent with this case:
A = 32 , α =
1
2 ,
ψ
k¯
= 0.05, π = 0.4, zL = 3, zH = 7.
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This implies the following result:
Proposition 14 If bD = ∅, then DN = ∅.
The corollary of this result is that no default under the T - good de-
nominated contract implies no default under the perfectly indexed nominal
contract. Under the assumption above, the ex-post utility for the borrower
is given by
αα (1− α)1−α k¯
·
z
¡
1−α
α
¢µ
1− Aα
(1−α)A[πzαL+(1−π)zαH]
¶¸
¡
z
A
1−α
α
¢1−α
= αA1−αk¯
"
zα
(1− α)
α
−
zα (1−α)α
(1− α)A1−α [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]
#
= A1−αzαk¯ (1− α)− z
α
[πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]
k¯
So in ex-ante terms:
V Bind = A
1−α (1− α) k¯ [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]− k¯
which is equal to the utility reached by the borrower with the other two con-
tracts when no default occurs under both of them. This has the implication
that the perfectly indexed contract can never be dominated by the T - good
debt contract.
What happens if the borrower has to choose among the three contracts?
We first have that
V Bind − UBT = A1−α (1− α) k¯ [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]− k¯
−

(1− α)A1−αk¯
X
(λ,z)
q (λ, z) zα − ψ (1− α)A1−αk¯
X
(λ,z)∈ bD
q (z,λ)
z1−α


= ψ (1− α)A1−αk¯
X
(λ,z)∈ bD
q (z,λ)
z1−α
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and
V Bind − UBnom = A1−α (1− α) k¯ [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]− k¯
−

(1− α)A1−αk¯
X
(λ,z)
q (λ, z) zα − k¯ − (1− α)A1−αk¯ψ
X
(λ,z)∈D
q (λ, z)
z1−α


= (1− α)A1−αk¯ψ
X
(λ,z)∈D
q (λ, z)
z1−α
So clearly, as long as no default occurs with indexed contracts, these are
preferred than non-indexed contracts (either nominal or in T-goods) except
when there is no default in these other cases.
7 Indexed contract with noisy signals in gen-
eral equilibrium (case of positively-correlated
real and nominal exchange rates).
As in the partial equilibrium case, we analyze now the choice of contract’s
unit of account when there is a nominal indexed contract but the lender can
only observe a noisy signal of the realization of λz. Again, assume that the
lender observes λpN (z) + x, where pN (z) = zA
1−α
α and where x can take
values on the set {−ε, 0, ε} . Assume that x is i.i.d. and the probability for
each possible realization is 1/3.We still assume also that qLL = qHH = 0 and
that π = qHL. If there is no default under this contract, the borrower must
pay
λApN (z) k¯ − r [λpN (z) + x] k¯ = λpN (z) [A− r] k¯ − rxk¯
where r is to be determined.
From the lender’s side, we can derive his nominal income for this contract
IL =
½
λ
£
zk¯ + rpN (z) k +
rx
λ k
¤
if no default
λk¯z + λApN (z) k − λψ if default
The ex-post utility for the lender is given by
ULexp (λ, z, x) =



αα (1− α)1−α
h
zk¯+rpN (z)k+
rx
λ
k
pN (z)
1−α
i
if no default
αα (1− α)1−α
h
zk¯+ApN (z)k−ψ
pN (z)
1−α
i
if default
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The lender’s problem is, as before:
max
k∈[0,k¯]
k¯ − k +E
£
ULexp (λ, z, x)
¤
subject to
k¯ − k +E
£
ULexp (λ, z, x)
¤
≥ k¯ +E
"
zαα (1− α)1−α k¯
pN (z)
1−α
#
Recall that α
α(1−α)1−α
pN (z)
1−α = αA
1−α
z1−α . Hence assuming that the constraint holds
with equality at the solution then
αA1−αk¯

r
X
i,j,x∈∆¯
qij
3
"
zαj
µ
1− α
αA
¶
+
x
λiz1−αj
#
+
X
i,j,x∈D¯
qij
3
Ã
zαj
µ
1− α
α
¶
− ψ
z1−αj
!
 = k¯
so we can derive r from here:
r =
1
αA1−α −
P
i,j,x∈D¯
qij
3
¡
zαj
¡
1−α
α
¢
− ψ
k¯
¢
P
i,j,x∈∆¯
qij
3
h
zαj
¡
1−α
αA
¢
+ xλi
i = 1− αA1−α
P
i,j,x∈D¯
qij
3
µ
zαj
¡
1−α
α
¢
− ψ
k¯z1−αj
¶
αA1−α
P
i,j,x∈∆¯
qij
3
h
zαj
¡
1−α
αA
¢
+ xλi
i
where qij = Pr [λ = λi, z = zj] , ∆¯ is the set of states where the borrower
does not default and D¯ is its complement. With this expression at hand, the
ex-post utility for the borrower is:
αα (1− α)1−α k¯

z
¡
1−α
α
¢
−


1−αA1−α
P
i,j,x∈D¯
qij
3
Ã
zαj ( 1−αα )−
ψ
k¯z1−α
j
!
αA1−α
P
i,j,x∈∆¯
qij
3
h
zαj (
1−α
αA )+
x
λi
i


£
z
A
1−α
α +
x
λ
¤
¡
z
A
1−α
α
¢1−α
= αk¯A1−α

z
α
µ
1− α
α
¶
−
£
z
A
¡
1−α
α
¢
+ xλ
¤
z1−α


1− αA1−α
P
i,j,x∈D¯
qij
3
µ
zαj
¡
1−α
α
¢
− ψ
k¯z1−αj
¶
αA1−α
P
i,j,x∈∆¯
qij
3
h
zαj
¡
1−α
αA
¢
+ xλi
i




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so in ex-ante terms
V Bindns = αk¯

A1−α
µ
1− α
α
¶ X
i,j∈∆¯
qijz
α
j
−


1− αA1−α
P
i,j,x∈D¯
qij
3
µ
zαj
¡
1−α
α
¢
− ψ
k¯z1−αj
¶
α
P
i,j,x∈∆¯
qij
3
h
zαj
¡
1−α
αA
¢
+ xλi
i



 X
i,j,x∈∆¯
qij
3
"
zαj
µ
1− α
αA
¶
+
x
z1−αj λi
We now consider the corresponding cases analyzed under partial equilib-
rium.
7.1 No default under indexed-nominal contract with
noise.
Suppose first that D¯ is empty. Therefore, for any λ, z it must happen that
λz
µ
1− α
α
¶
≥ r
·
λ
z
A
(1− α)
α
+ ε
¸
Note that if this holds, the same inequality holds when x = 0 or x = −ε.
Replacing by the expression of r :
λz
µ
1− α
α
¶
≥

 λ
z
A
(1−α)
α + ε
αA1−α
P
i,j,x
qij
3
h
zαj
¡
1−α
αA
¢
+ xλi
i


We can say then that this is true when ε is bounded above by·
λz
µ
1− α
α
¶¸""
αA1−α
X
i,j,x
qij
3
·
zαj
µ
1− α
αA
¶
+
x
λi
¸#
− 1
A
#
for any λ, z. Therefore a suﬃcient condition for this to hold is
ε ≤ max {λHzL;λLzH}
µ
1− α
α
¶"
αA1−α
X
i,j,x
qij
3
·
zαj
µ
1− α
αA
¶
+
x
λi
¸
− 1
A
#
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But X
i,j,x
qij
3
x
λi
=
X
i,j
qij
λi
X
x
x
3
=
X
i,j
qij
λi
0 = 0
so
ε ≤ max {λHzL;λLzH}
µ
1− α
α
¶"
(1− α) A
1−α
A
X
i,j,x
qij
3
£
zαj
¤
− 1
A
#
In this case then the ex-post utility for the borrower is
αk¯A1−α

zα
µ
1− α
α
¶
−
£
z
¡
1−α
α
¢
+ xλ
¤
z1−α

 1
αA1−α
P
i,j,x
qij
3
h
zαj
¡
1−α
α
¢
+ xλi
i




= αk¯A1−α
"
zα
µ
1− α
α
¶
−
£
z
A
¡
1−α
α
¢
+ xλ
¤
z1−α
Ã
1
αA1−α
P
i,j
qij
3
£
zαj
¡
1−α
αA
¢¤!#
and the ex-ante expected utility is equal to:
V Bindns = αk¯


A
1−α
µ
1− α
α
¶X
i,j
qijz
α
j −


P
i,j
qij
3
h
zαj
A
¡
1−α
α
¢i
α
P
i,j
qij
3
h
zαj
A
¡
1−α
α
¢i





= k¯
"
A1−α (1− α)
X
i,j
qijz
α
j − 1
#
= k¯
£
A1−α (1− α) [πzαL + (1− α) zαH ]− 1
¤
This is clearly equal to the ex-ante utility obtained by borrowers when in-
dexed contract without noise are used. Hence all the welfare results related
to that contract applies here.
7.2 Default with suﬃciently large noise
Suppose now that ε is large enough such that, for any pair (λ, z) borrowers de-
fault. Hence D¯ = {Λ× Z} × {ε}= {(λL, zH , ε) ; (λH , zL, ε) ; (λL, zL, ε) ; (λH , zH , ε)} .
Note that the last two elements are 0-probability events. For this to be a
possible equilibrium we must observe that:
λizj
µ
1− α
α
¶
< rdef
·
λi
zj
A
µ
1− α
α
¶
+ ε
¸
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where
rdef =
1− αA1−α
3
³
π
³
zαL
¡
1−α
α
¢
− ψ
k¯z1−αL
´
+ (1− π)
³¡
1−α
α
¢
zαH − ψk¯z1−αH
´´
αA1−α
h
2
3
¡
1−α
αA
¢
[πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]− ε3
h
π
λHz
1−α
L
+ 1−π
λLz
1−α
H
ii
Note that a suﬃcient condition for the inequality above to hold is:
ε >
µ
1− α
α
¶
max {λHzL;λLzH}



αA1−α
h
2
3
¡
1−α
αA
¢
[πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]− ε3
h
π
λHz
1−α
L
+ 1−π
λLz
1−α
H
ii
1− αA1−α
3
³
π
³
zαL
¡
1−α
α
¢
− ψ
k¯z1−αL
´
+ (1− π)
³¡
1−α
α
¢
zαH −
ψ
k¯z1−αH
´´ − 1
A



Since ε also appears on the left hand side, we solve for ε so that
ε

1 +
h
π
λHz
1−α
L
+ 1−π
λLz
1−α
H
i ¡
1−α
α
¢
max {λHzL;λLzH}
3− αA1−α
³
π
³
zαL
¡
1−α
α
¢
− ψ
k¯z1−αL
´
+ (1− π)
³¡
1−α
α
¢
zαH −
ψ
k¯z1−αH
´´


>
µ
1− α
α
¶
max {λHzL;λLzH}



αA1−α2
¡
1−α
αA
¢
[πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]
3− αA1−α
³
π
³
zαL
¡
1−α
α
¢
− ψ
k¯z1−αL
´
+ (1− π)
³¡
1−α
α
¢
zαH − ψk¯z1−αH
´´ − 1
A



or
ε >
¡
1−α
α
¢
max {λHzL;λLzH}



αA1−α2( 1−ααA )[πzαL+(1−π)zαH]
3−αA1−α
µ
π
µ
zαL(
1−α
α )−
ψ
k¯z1−α
L
¶
+(1−π)
µ
( 1−αα )zαH−
ψ
k¯z1−α
H
¶¶ − 1
A




1 +
·
π
λHz
1−α
L
+ 1−π
λLz
1−α
H
¸
( 1−αα )max{λHzL;λLzH}
3−αA1−α
µ
π
µ
zαL(
1−α
α )−
ψ
k¯z1−α
L
¶
+(1−π)
µ
( 1−αα )zαH−
ψ
k¯z1−α
H
¶¶


If this holds, then the ex-post utility for the borrower in state (λi, zj, x) is
given by:
UB,indnsex−p−def = A
1−αzαj (1− α)− rdefαA1−α
"¡
λi
¡ zj
A
1−α
α
¢
+ x
¢
λi (zj)
1−α
#
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(given that x 6= ε. If x = ε the borrower gets just 0). Therefore the ex-ante
utility for the borrower is (see appendiz for details).
V B,defindns = A
1−α (1− α) k¯ [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]− k¯ − ψA1−α
α
3
·
π
z1−αL
+
1− π
z1−αH
¸
Suppose now that the parameters are such that, if the borrower must
choose between a nominal-indexed contract (with noise) and a T-good con-
tract that induces default at (λH , zL) then the diﬀerence in ex-ante utilities
is equal to:
UBT − V
B,def
indns = −
A1−ααψ
3
·
3π
z1−αL
−
·
π
z1−αL
+
1− π
z1−αH
¸¸
= −A
1−ααψ
3
·
2π
z1−αL
− 1− π
z1−αH
¸
Therefore the borrower chooses a default-inducing T − good contract rather
than a default-inducing indexed-nominal contract if 2π
z1−αL
− 1−π
z1−αH
< 0 or
2π
z1−αL
<
1− π
z1−αH
which is equivalent to
1− π
π
> 2
µ
zH
zL
¶1−α
Note that since the right hand side is strictly greater than 2 then this im-
plies that π < 1
3
. In other words, for a borrower to make such a choice the
probability of state (λH , zL) must be smaller than the probability that x =
ε.
8 Concluding Remarks
The preliminary exploration in this paper tends to confirm in general some
simple intuitions. Unsteady monetary policies, which make uncertain the
real outcome of nominal contracts and which, when very erratic, also make
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nominal contracts less attractive (due to reporting lags) tend to induce dol-
larization of liabilities as long as the volatility of the real exchange rate is not
too large. However, the vulnerability of those contracts to real exchange rate
shocks (which may result in some instances in widespread defaults) is one of
the large costs associated with the failure to provide a workable “domestic”
unit of account for transactions among residents.
The model above assumes that the real shocks are completely driven by
the relative price of non - tradeables (which is exogenously random). This
assumption provides suﬃcient intuition to start analyzing the role of nominal
and real shocks in the choice of the currency denomination of debt contracts.
However, the model above clearly ignores general equilibrium eﬀects. Also,
the model above is not completely suitable to be interpreted as a domestic
lender - domestic borrower relationship, since it is not natural to think that
domestic lenders do not care about non - traded goods.
In order to tackle this problem, we propose to analyze a more general
model, sketched in the appendix. This model assumes symmetric prefer-
ences between (domestic) lenders and domestic borrowers, both having Cobb
- Douglas preferences defined over tradeables and non - tradeables. Domestic
lenders receive a shock (in the future period) on their traded - good endow-
ments, which substitutes for the shock on pN in the sections above. We ac-
tually deduce the equilibrium value of pN as a function of those endowment
shocks. We also consider the possibility of strategic default by borrowers in
the model of the appendix. The reader may verify that this second frame-
work, although more complete, implies a much more cumbersome algebra
to obtain the results. Further work is needed to make more trasparent the
intuition behind some of those results.
Actually this second model also considers the case of indexed contracts
and also it discusses why these contracts may not arise in equilibrium. The
argument we use is the presence of costly state verification when considering
indexed contracts. Indeed, in reality most of these contracts should be in-
dexed to prices of various non - tradeables, most of which are services. Thus,
it is unclear how a lender may monitor for free the ex-post state of the bor-
rower which produces such services. On the other hand, publicly available
price indices are only known with a lag with respect to time to which prices
refer. The non - free - verification assumption is suﬃcient to exclude indexed
contracts in some cases. Hence, there are insyances where the relevant com-
parison reduces again to that between nominal (non - indexed) and traded -
good denominated debt contracts.
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These results are related to the general discussion about indexed contracts
as presented, for example, in Fischer (1983). This also tests the absence of
indexed bonds in the U.S. market based on his theoretical earlier work (see
Fischer, 1975). His main conclusion is that the factors that, according to his
theory, should help to explain this absence are in fact false in practice. Even
though the aim of this paper was clearly not to explain this puzzle posed
by Fischer, our model stresses also an aspect ignored by these explanations,
namely, the fact that optimal indexation may imply high verification costs.
We have explored the choice of contractual units in a very simple setting.
A natural extension of the argument would be to incorporate hedging behav-
ior on the part of agents, or diﬀerent motives for borrowing (e.g. by producers
of traded goods) which could result in a representation of states with mul-
tiple contractual forms. Another noticeable simplification of the argument
was in the assumption that the “nominal shock” is independent of the de-
nomination of assets. Modeling the policy-game that determines monetary
policies in conjunction with the choice of denomination can be interesting
to undertake. In this regard, to the extent that “asset dollarization” would
discourage monetary variability, it need not be the case that large mone-
tary shocks are actually observed in “dollarized economies”. The relevant
parameter to define the incentives for private agents to dollarize would be
the variability under contracting in “domestic units”.
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A Proofs of propositions (general equilibrium
model)
Proof of proposition 5. The proof is a simple comparison of the ex-ante
borrower’s utility from either contract. The utility from the dollar contract
is
V b,Tnodef = Λ
£
A [πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH ]−
£
πpα−1NL + (1− π) pα−1NH
¤¤
Hence the comparison is just between
− [πp
α
NL + (1− π) pαNH ]
πpNL + (1− π) pNH
and
−
£
πpα−1NL + (1− π) pα−1NH
¤
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To prove this, suppose that the T − good contract gives more utility. Hence
−
£
πpα−1NL + (1− π) pα−1NH
¤
≥ − [πp
α
NL+(1−π)pαNH]
πpNL+(1−π)pNH . Or£
πpα−1NL + (1− π) pα−1NH
¤
≤ [πp
α
NL + (1− π) pαNH ]
πpNL + (1− π) pNH
equivalent to£
πpα−1NL + (1− π) pα−1NH
¤
[πpNL + (1− π) pNH ] ≤ [πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH ]
⇔
π2pαNL + (1− π)
2 pαNH + π (1− π)
·
pαNL
µ
pNH
pNL
¶
+ pαNH
µ
pNL
pNH
¶¸
≤ [πpαNL + (1− π) pαNH ]
⇔
π (1− π)
·
pαNL
µ
pNH
pNL
¶
+ pαNH
µ
pNL
pNH
¶¸
≤ π (1− π) pαNL + (1− π)πpαNH
⇔
pαNL
µ
pNH
pNL
¶
+ pαNH
µ
pNL
pNH
¶
≤ pαNL + pαNH
⇔
pαNL
µ
pNH
pNL
− 1
¶
≤ pαNH
µ
1− pNL
pNH
¶
⇔ pαNL
µ
pNH − pNL
pNL
¶
≤ pαNH
µ
pNH − pNL
pNH
¶
Since pNH ≥ pNL then this is equivalent to pα−1NL ≤ pα−1NH , or
p1−αNH ≤ p1−αNL
and since 1− α > 0 then pNH ≤ pNL, a contradiction. Then we must have
that V b,Tnodef < V
b,ind
nodef .
Proof of proposition 7. It is true that for zL large enough such that
πA1−αzαL > 1, then
z1−αL
A1−α
< π (1− α) zL
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which implies that there is no default under zL, and since zH and 1− π are
both strictly positive
π
z1−αL³
π
z1−αL
+ 1−π
z1−αH
´ < 1
which implies that there is no default under state zH .
Proof of proposition 8. We basically need first thatÃ 1
A1−α +
αχ
k¯
π
z1−αL
− (1− α)πzαL
α (1− π)
!
z1−αH ≤ zH
µ
1− α
α
¶
or equivalently: Ã 1
A1−α +
αχ
k¯
π
z1−αL
− (1− α)πzαL
(1− α) (1− π)
!
≤ zαH
Clearly, for given zL, there exists values for zH such that this holds. In
fact there exists a unique htreshold value zH (zL) such that, for any zH >
zH (zL) the inequality holds strict. On the other hand we also need that zL be
suﬃciently low so that the borrower does not repay his debt under the non-
default interest rate, that is 1
A1−αα
µ
π
z1−α
L
+ 1−π
z1−α
H
¶ > zL ¡1−αα ¢ , or equivalently,
1
A1−α (1− α)
³
π
z1−αL
+ 1−π
z1−αH
´ > zL
It can be shown that 1
A1−α(1−α)
µ
π
z1−α
L
+ 1−π
z1−α
H
¶ is less than
Ã
1
A1−α+
αχ
k¯
π
z1−α
L
−(1−α)πzαL
(1−α)(1−π)
!
4,
4This is because 1
A1−α(1−α)
µ
π
z
1−α
L
+ 1−π
z
1−α
H
¶ <
Ã
1
A1−α
+αχ
k¯
π
z
1−α
L
−(1−α)πzαL
(1−α)(1−π)
!
z1−αH is equiv-
alent to
1−π
z1−α
Hµ
π
z1−α
L
+ 1−π
z1−α
H
¶ < 1 + A1−α π
z1−αL
[φα− (1− α) zL] . However, we know that zL <
1
A1−α(1−α)
µ
π
z1−α
L
+ 1−π
z1−α
H
¶ so 1 − zL (1− α)A1−α > 1 − 1µ
π
z1−α
L
+ 1−π
z1−α
H
¶ =
1−π
z1−α
Hµ
π
z1−α
L
+ 1−π
z1−α
H
¶ .
Given that φ > 0 we obtained the desired result.
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so that zL <
Ã
1
A1−α+
αχ
k¯
π
z1−α
L
−(1−α)πzαL
(1−α)(1−π)
!
z1−αH , so default occurs eﬀectively at
zL. This shows the result.
Proof of Proposition 9. Note that since π
z1−αH
> 0 and λHλL > 1 then
λH
λL
1−π
z1−αH
+ π
z1−αL
> 1−π
z1−αH
+ π
z1−αL
> π
z1−αL
for any λ0js and z
0
ks. So
1
A1−αα
³
λH
λL
1−π
z1−αH
+ π
z1−αL
´ < 1
A1−αα π
z1−αL
=
z1−αL
αA1−απ
Hence as zL is large enough
z1−αL
αA1−απ must be less than zL since the first is a
strictly concave function. Therefore zL is greater than 1
A1−αα
µ
λH
λL
1−π
z1−α
H
+ π
z1−α
L
¶ .
As zH > zL, so happens with zH . On the other hand, since 1−πz1−αH
+ λLλH
π
z1−αL
>
1−π
z1−αH
then
1
A1−αα
³
1−π
z1−αH
+ λLλH
π
z1−αL
´ < 1
A1−αα
³
1−π
z1−αH
´ = z1−αH
A1−αα (1− π)
Given that this is a strictly concave function, there exists zL is large enough
so that
zH > zL >
z1−αH
A1−αα (1− π)
This shows the result.
Proof of Proposition 10. Start by assuming that
A1−αzL <
1
(1− α)
h
π
z1−αL
+ 1−π
z1−αH
i
so that it is not true that no default occurs with dollar contracts. However,
no default occurs under nominal contracts with zL if
A1−αzL ≥
1
(1− α)
h
π
z1−αL
+
³
λH
λL
´
1−π
z1−αH
i
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Solving for
³
λH
λL
´
this inequality is equivalent to:
λH
λL
≥
µ
zL
zH
¶µ
z1−αH
1− π
¶·
1
(1− α)A1−α − πz
α
L
¸
There is no default if zH under nominal contracts if and only if
A1−αzH ≥
1
(1− α)
h³
λL
λH
´
π
z1−αL
+ 1−π
z1−αH
i
solving for
³
λL
λH
´
yields:
λL
λH
≥
µ
zL
zH
¶µ
z1−αL
π
¶µ
1
A1−α (1− α) − (1− π) z
α
H
¶
or
λH
λL
≤
µ
zH
zL
¶µ
π
z1−αL
¶Ã
1
1
A1−α(1−α) − (1− π) zαH
!
The combination of both inequalities give the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 11. The first inequality is the same as
zL
µ
1− α
α
¶
λH <
λLλHh
π
z1−αL
λL + 1−πz1−αH
λH
i
αA1−α
⇔ zL <
λL
A1−α (1− α)
h
π
z1−αL
λL + 1−πz1−αH
λH
i
which proves the first part. The second inequality is


1
A1−α +
αψ
k¯
π
z1−αL
− (1− α) πzαL
α


µ
z1−αH
1− π
¶
λL ≤ λLzH
µ
1− α
α
¶
so


1
A1−α +
αψ
k¯
π
z1−αL
− (1− α)πzαL
(1− α) (1− π)

 ≤ zαH
This holds for suﬃciently large zH .
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Proof of Proposition 12. We have default at (λL, zH) when λH
A1−αα
µ
π
z1−α
L
λL+
1−π
z1−α
H
λH
¶
= 1
A1−αα
µ
π
z1−α
L
λL
λH
+ 1−π
z1−α
H
¶ > zH ¡1−αα ¢ . Note that when ³λHλL ´ is large enough,
the expression 1
A1−α(1−α)
µ
π
z1−α
L
λL
λH
+ 1−π
z1−α
H
¶ is close enough to 1
A1−α(1−α)
µ
1−π
z1−α
H
¶
= z
1−α
H
A1−α(1−α)(1−π) . When zH is small enough then this is strictly larger than
zH . In particular, this is true whenever zH <
h
1
A1−α(1−α)(1−π)
i 1
1−α
. Hence un-
der this conditoin and the fact that
³
λH
λL
´
is large enough guarantees that
there is default at the state (λL, zH) . On the other hand, there is no default
in state (λH , zL) if


1
A1−α +
αψ
k¯
³
1−π
z1−αH
´
− (1− α) (1− π) zαH
απ

λHz1−αL ≤ λHzL
µ
1− α
α
¶
Rearranging gives directly:
zαL (1− α)π ≥
·
1
A1−α
+
αψ (1− π)
z1−αH
− (1− α) (1− π) zαH
¸
which is the second desired inequality.
Proof of Proposition 13. If the total absence of default were true
then the first order conditions from the lender imply
r =
Aα
(1− α) [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]
On the other hand, there is no default under any state if and only if
r ≤ A
equivalent to
1
(1− α) [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]A1−α
≤ 1
which holds given the assumption in the statement. This ends the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 14. If bD = ∅ then
1
A1−αα
³
π
z1−αL
+ 1−π
z1−αH
´ 5 µ1− α
α
¶
θzL + (1− χ)
µ
ψ
k¯
¶
which is the same as
1
(1− α)A1−α 5
µ
π
z1−αL
+
1− π
z1−αH
¶
zLθ + (1− χ)
µ
α
1− α
¶µ
ψ
k¯
¶µ
π
z1−αL
+
1− π
z1−αH
¶
< θ (πzαL + (1− π) zαH) + (1− χ)
µ
α
1− α
¶µ
ψ
k¯
¶µ
π
z1−αL
+
1− π
z1−αH
¶
= π
·
θzαL +
η
z1−αL
¸
+ (1− π)
·
θzαH +
η
z1−αH
¸
where the last equality comes from the definition of η. Hence the inequality
to have DN = ∅ also holds here.
Proof of the derivation of V B,defindns . According to the main text,
ex-post we have (for the no-default states)
UB,indnsex−p−def = A
1−αzαj (1− α) k¯ − rdefαA1−α
"¡
λi
¡zj
A
1−α
α
¢
+ x
¢
λi (zj)
1−α
#
k¯
So in ex-ante terms we obtain
V B,defindns = A
1−α (1− α) [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]
µ
2
3
¶
k¯
−rdefαA1−α
½µ
2
3A
µ
1− α
α
¶¶
[πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]−
ε
3
·
π
λHz1−αL
+
1− π
λLz1−αH
¸¾
k¯
Now, the lender’s FOC in this case can be written as:
rdefαA1−α
X
i,j,x∈∆¯
qij
3
"
zαj
µ
1− α
αA
¶
+
x
λiz1−αj
#
= 1− αA1−α
X
i,j,x∈D¯
qij
3
Ã
zαj
µ
1− α
α
¶
− ψ
z1−αj
!
⇔
rdefαA1−α
·µ
1− α
αA
¶
2
3
[πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]−
1
3
ε
·
π
λHz1−αL
+
1− π
λLz1−αH
¸¸
= 1− αA
1−α
3
·µ
1− α
α
¶
[πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]− ψ
·
π
z1−αL
+
1− π
z1−αH
¸¸
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Hence replacing this expression in that of V B,defindns we get
V B,defindns = A
1−α (1− α) [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ]
µ
2
3
¶
k¯
−k¯ + A
1−α (1− α)
3
[πzαL + (1− π) zαH ] k¯ − ψ
αA1−α
3
·
π
z1−αL
+
1− π
z1−αH
¸
= A1−α (1− α) [πzαL + (1− π) zαH ] k¯ − k¯ − ψ
αA1−α
3
·
π
z1−αL
+
1− π
z1−αH
¸
which is what we wanted to show.
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